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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, : 
Plaintiff/Appellee, : Case No. 920104 
-vs- s 
JOSEPH CHARLES GARDNER, JR., : Category No. 2 
Defendant/Appellant : 
BRIEF OF APPELLEE 
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS 
Pursuant to a plea bargain, defendant pled guilty to criminal 
homicide, murder in the first degree, a violation of Utah Code Ann. 
S 76-5-202 (1990). In exchange for such plea, the State dismissed 
a second count of aggravated burglary and agreed not to ask for the 
death penalty. Defendant's plea was entered conditionally pursuant 
to State v. Serv, 759 P.2d 935 (Utah App. 1988), to preserve his 
right to appeal from a pretrial order concerning the legal standard 
applicable to the defense of involuntary intoxication. He was 
sentenced to life imprisonment. 
This Court has jurisdiction pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-
2(3)(i) (1992). 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES AND STANDARD OF APPELLATE REVIEW 
The only issue on appeal is: Did the trial court properly 
determine the legal standard applicable to the defense of 
involuntary intoxication? 
Standard of Review: This Court accords the trial court's 
conclusions of law no deference but reviews them for correctness. 
Scharf v. BMG Corp.. 700 P.2d 1068 (Utah 1985). 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS. STATUTES AND RULES 
Utah Code Ann., § 76-2-305 (Supp. 1992): 
(1) It is a defense to a prosecution under any statute 
or ordinance that the defendant, as a result of mental 
illness, lacked the mental state required as an element of the 
offense charged. Mental illness is not otherwise a defense. 
(2) ... 
(3) A person who is under the influence of voluntarily 
consumed or injected alcohol, controlled substances, or 
volatile substances at the time of the alleged offense is not 
excused from criminal responsibility on the basis of mental 
illness. 
(4) "Mental illness" means a mental disease or defect 
that substantially impairs a person's mental, emotional, or 
behavioral functioning. A mental defect may be a congenital 
condition, the result of injury, or a residual effect of a 
physical or mental disease and includes, but is not limited 
to, mental retardation. Mental illness does not mean a 
personality or character disorder or abnormality manifested 
only by repeated criminal conduct. 
(5) ... 
Utah Code Ann., § 76-2-306 (1990): 
Voluntary intoxication shall not be a defense to a 
criminal charge unless such intoxication negates the existence 
of the mental state which is an element of the offense; 
however, if recklessness or criminal negligence establishes 
an element of an offense and the actor is unaware of the risk 
because of voluntary intoxication, his unawareness is 
immaterial in a prosecution for that offense. 
Utah Code Ann.# § 76-5-202 (1990): 
(1) Criminal homicide constitutes murder in the first 
degree if the actor intentionally or knowingly causes the 
death of another under any of the following circumstances: 
2 
(d) The homicide was committed while the actor was 
engaged in the commission of, or an attempt to commit, or 
flight after committing or attempting to commit,...aggravated 
burglary... 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
On July 25, 1990, the State of Utah filed an information 
against defendant, charging him with criminal homicide, murder in 
the first degree, a capital offense (R. 5) . Thereafter, on 
September 5, 1991, the State filed an amended information adding a 
second count of aggravated burglary, a first degree felony (R. 66) . 
On September 5, 1991, defendant entered pleas of not guilty 
and not guilty by reason of insanity (R. 68-73). 
Based upon representations by defense counsel that the defense 
would be involuntary intoxication based upon the ingestion of the 
prescription drug Prozac, the State filed a Motion for Pre-trial 
Determination of Legal Standard Re: Defense of Involuntary 
Intoxication (R. 85-87), together with a supporting memorandum of 
points and authorities (R. 88-102). 
On November 21, 1991, defendant filed a Request for 
Declaratory Judgment Re: Involuntary Intoxication (R. 159-164), 
joining the State's request for a pretrial determination of the 
applicable legal standard. 
A hearing was held on November 26, 1991, after which 
additional memoranda were filed by the parties concerning the 
applicable legal standard (R. 176-181, 193-201). 
On January 8, 1992, the trial court issued its Order Re: Legal 
Standard Applicable to Defense of Involuntary Intoxication (R. 242-
3 
243 contains original order with typographical error, which is 
reproduced in Appendix 2 of defendant's brief; the typographical 
error was not noted until after defendant filed his brief). The 
trial court's corrected order is contained in the supplemental 
record filed with this Court on November 9, 1992. A copy of the 
motion, stipulation and corrected order are attached hereto as 
Addendum A, 
Because no hearing was ever held or testimony ever received 
concerning whether defendant would qualify factually or legally for 
an involuntary intoxication defense, the trial court's order listed 
principles applicable to voluntary intoxication as well as 
involuntary intoxication. 
On January 10, 1992, defendant pled guilty to Count I, 
Criminal Homicide, Murder in the First Degree, pursuant to the 
Statement of Defendant and Plea Agreement which he signed in open 
court (R. 267-276) . According the terms of the agreement, the 
State dismissed Count II, Aggravated Burglary, and further agreed 
that it would not seek the death penalty. Defendant's plea was 
entered conditionally to preserve for appeal the issue concerning 
the legal standard applicable to the defense of involuntary 
intoxication which was the subject of the trial court's ruling (R. 
271) . 
Defendant timely filed a notice of appeal (R. 285-286). 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
In the early morning hours of July 22, 1990, defendant 
unlawfully entered the apartment of Janice Fondren in St. George, 
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Utah, and killed her with a 9 mm, pistol (R. 268) . He was 
thereafter charged with first degree murder and aggravated 
burglary, 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The trial court properly ruled that involuntary intoxication 
leading to a temporary mental illness can constitute a defense if 
brought within Utah Code Ann. § 76-2-305 (Supp. 1992) , which by its 
very terms governs all mental illness defenses in Utah. That 
statute specifically excludes from the defense any mental illness 
brought about through voluntary intoxication, but does not so 
exclude involuntary intoxication. The trial court's ruling is 
consistent with the statute and with authority that the mental 
state of an involuntarily intoxicated defendant is measured by the 
test of legal insanity. 
The trial court properly ruled that "irresistible impulse," or 
inability to conform one's conduct to the requirements of law, is 
no longer a defense under Utah law. The Legislature specifically 
repealed irresistible impulse as a mental illness defense in 1983, 
as did the United States Congress and a number of state 
legislatures. Had the trial court instructed that irresistible 
impulse was a defense, it would have constituted error. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE TRIAL COURT'S ORDER CORRECTLY INCORPORATES 
THE PRINCIPLES OF UTAH LAW APPLICABLE TO THE 
DEFENSE OF INVOLUNTARY INTOXICATION. 
It is important at the outset to point out that the trial 
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court's order deals only with the legal standard for involuntary 
intoxication which would apply should the defendant factually and 
legally qualify for it. There are a variety of factual issues 
which were never addressed at the trial court level, including the 
following: to what extent, if any, defendant may have actually 
ingested any prescription drug, either alone or in combination with 
other substances prior to the crime; whether any such drugs in fact 
affected his behavior in any way; whether, if he took such drugs, 
they were taken under the direction of a physician; whether, if 
they were so taken and he were rendered intoxicated by them, such 
would render his intoxication "involuntary"; and like 
considerations. The State points this out as an initial matter so 
that the Court understands that the State in no way accepts the 
premise that defendant would qualify either factually or legally 
for an involuntary intoxication defense if the case went to trial. 
The State's consistent position throughout the proceedings below 
has been that these are open questions which would be the subject 
of further hearings and the production of evidence before any 
determination could be made (R. 193-201). 
This case is therefore before the Court solely on the issue of 
the trial court's interpretation of Utah law as it pertains to the 
defense of involuntary intoxication. In other words, assuming for 
the purpose of argument that defendant could otherwise qualify for 
an involuntary intoxication defense, what is the proper legal 
standard which would govern it? 
Since the Utah Criminal Code contains no specific defense of 
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involuntary intoxication, the State raised the issue early in the 
proceedings, and defendant agreed that it would be to the benefit 
of all parties to have the legal issue resolved at the outset. The 
trial court properly ruled on the legal standard which would apply 
in such circumstances, as explained below. 
A. THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY RULED THAT 
INVOLUNTARY INTOXICATION LEADING TO 
A TEMPORARY MENTAL ILLNESS CAN CONSTI-
TUTE A DEFENSE IF BROUGHT WITHIN THE 
PROVISIONS OF UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-2-305. 
The trial court correctly ruled that involuntary intoxication 
leading to a temporary mental illness can constitute a defense in 
Utah. 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-2-305 (Supp. 1992) provides in part as 
follows: 
(1) It is a defense to a prosecution under 
any statute that the defendant, as a result of 
mental illness, lacked the mental state required 
as an element of the offense charged. Mental 
illness is not otherwise a defense. 
(3) A person who is under the influence of 
voluntarily consumed or injected alcohol, controlled 
substances, or volatile substances at the time of the 
alleged offense is not excused from criminal 
responsibility on the basis of mental illness. 
(4) "Mental illness" means a mental disease 
or defect that substantially impairs a person's 
mental, emotional, or behavioral functioning.... 
(emphasis added). 
By its very terms, then, section 76-2-305 governs all mental 
defenses in Utah. The trial court addressed the question of 
whether involuntary intoxication leading to a temporary mental 
illness could constitute a defense, notwithstanding the absence of 
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a specific statute in Utah covering involuntary intoxication. 
While section 76-2-305(3) specifically excludes from the defense 
any mental illness brought about through voluntary intoxication, it 
does not rule out involuntary intoxication as a defense under the 
statute. Thus, involuntary intoxication is still available as a 
defense under the mental illness defense statute, provided the 
defendant can bring forth evidence that such intoxication was in 
fact involuntarily induced. 
Involuntary intoxication is generally recognized as a defense 
in instances where a defendant is rendered temporarily insane due 
to the ingestion of prescription medication taken under the 
direction of a physician. See Involuntary Intoxication as Defense, 
73 A.L.R.3d 195, 214-216 (1976). 
An accused who is unable to form the statutory mental state 
due to either mental illness or involuntary intoxication leading to 
temporary mental illness can avail himself of the defense under 
section 76-2-305. To the extent such a defendant does not form the 
mental state to commit the crime, he is not blameworthy. This 
applies equally to defendants who are mentally ill and those whose 
mental derangement is caused by involuntary intoxication. 
Defendant's claim that he should be allowed to assert a defense 
standard different from and more favorable to him than that 
applicable to other mental illness defenses is not supported by 
authority. 
Several other states, which, like Utah, have no statutory 
defense of involuntary intoxication, recognize it as coming within 
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their general insanity statutes as a type of temporary insanity. 
People v. Wilkins. 459 N.W.2d 57 (Mich, 1990); Jones v. State. 648 
P.2d 1251, 1258 (Okl.Cr. 1982), See also R. Perkins & R. Boyce, 
Criminal Law 1005 (3d ed. 1982) (involuntary intoxication 
establishes that the accused's "derangement is without culpability 
and hence is to be dealt with the same as if it were the result of 
mental disease or defect") 
Federal decisions have also recognized that "the mental state 
of an involuntarily intoxicated defendant is measured by the test 
of legal insanity." United States v. F.D.L.. 836 F.2d 1113, 1116 
(8th Cir. 1988). 
"To establish an involuntary intoxication defense it must not 
only be proven that the defendant was involuntarily intoxicated, 
but also that because of his intoxication he was rendered legally 
insane during the time he committed the offense." 73 A.L.R.3d at 
204. 
As indicated, the defense of insanity in Utah is governed by 
section 76-2-305. A brief historical overview of the evolution of 
the defense of mental disease or defect helps put the present 
statute into perspective. 
In 1973, the Utah Legislature for the first time codified the 
defense of insanity, and provided as follows: 
In any prosecution for an offense, it 
shall be a defense that the defendant at 
the time of the proscribed conduct, as 
a result of mental disease or defect, 
lacked substantial capacity either to 
appreciate the wrongfulness of his conduct 
or to conform his conduct to the requirements 
of law. 
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Former § 76-2-305 (L. 1973, ch. 196, § 76-2-305). 
This was a codification of the Model Penal Code formulation 
for insanity, and was consistent with the former common law 
standard, as a combination of the M'Naghten test and the 
"irresistible impulse" test. State v. Domincruez. 564 P.2d 768, 770 
(Utah 1977). 
The M'Naghten rule, established in England in 1843, provided 
that: 
to establish a defence on the ground of 
insanity, it must be clearly proved that, 
at the time of the committing of the act, 
the party accused was labouring under such 
a defect of reason, from disease of the mind, 
as not to know the nature and quality of the 
act he was doing; or, if he did know it, that 
he did not know he was doing what was wrong. 
10 CI. & F. 200, 3 Eng.Reprint 718 (1843). 
The M'Naghten standard has been widely applied throughout the 
United States, either through case law decisions or through state 
statutes. 
In 1983, the Utah Legislature explicitly rejected the 
M'Naghten/"irresistible impulse"/Model Penal Code standard by 
repealing and reenacting section 76-2-305 in its present form. The 
standard now focuses exclusively on the defendant's mens rea, that 
is, whether the defendant lacked the mental state required as an 
element of the offense charged. 
The Legislature simultaneously enacted "guilty and mentally 
ill" provisions which may apply to defendants who were mentally ill 
at the time of the offense but who nonetheless were able to form 
the mental state set out in the statute. Utah Code Ann. § 77-35-
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21,5 (1982) (repealed effective July 1, 1990; currently contained 
in Rule 21.5, Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure) . See also State v. 
DePlonty. 749 P.2d 621, 627 (Utah 1987). (For further insight into 
legislative intent, see "Report on the Insanity Defense in Criminal 
Prosecution and Proposed Legislation" from the Task Force Committee 
on Insanity Defense, dated December 27, 1982, attached hereto as 
Addendum B.) 
While there is case law pertaining to involuntary intoxication 
from other jurisdictions which focuses on the ability of the 
defendant to appreciate the wrongfulness of his conduct or to 
conform his conduct to the requirements of law, such cases are 
readily distinguishable. Those jurisdictions have either codified 
the defense of involuntary intoxication, as is the case in Colorado 
[Colo. Rev. Stat. § 18-1-804 (1986)], or they still adhere to the 
Model Penal Code or common law test for insanity, so that their 
standard for involuntary intoxication is consistent with their 
insanity statutes or rules. See W. LaFave & A. Scott, Handbook on 
Criminal Law § 45 at 347 (1972) (involuntary intoxication is "a 
defense if it puts the defendant in such a state of mind, e.g., so 
that he does not know the nature and quality of his act or know 
that his act is wrong, in a jurisdiction which has adopted the 
M'Naghten test for insanity") (emphasis added). 
As indicated above, Utah no longer follows the 
M'Naghten/"irresistible impulse" test, having enacted a strict mens 
rea mental defense statute in 1983 (§ 76-2-305) which exclusively 
governs all mental illness defenses. 
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Further, there is no common law defense of involuntary 
intoxication available in Utah. See State v. Gardiner, 814 P.2d 
568, 573-574 (Utah 1991) (common law defenses abolished in 1973 
when legislature enacted the Utah Criminal Code). The defense of 
involuntary intoxication is therefore governed by section 76-2-305 
and not by any other legal standard, as the trial court properly 
ruled, 
B. THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY RULED THAT UTAH HAS 
ABOLISHED THE IRRESISTIBLE IMPULSE DEFENSE 
A defendant has no constitutional right to an "irresistible 
impulse" defense. Leland v. Oregon. 343 U.S. 790, 72 S.Ct. 1002, 
96 L.Ed. 1302 (1952). It is a creation of either statute or, in 
some states, common law. As such, it can be changed through 
legislation, as has occurred not only in Utah, but in other states 
as well. Hart v. State. 702 P.2d 651, 659 (Alaska App. 1985) 
(state may constitutionally eliminate from its insanity defense 
"irresistible impulse" or inability to conform one's conduct to 
requirements of the law.) Also, in 1984, the Congress of the 
United States abolished the volitional prong (ability to conform 
one's conduct to requirements of law) of the Model Penal Code by 
enacting 18 U.S.C. § 17. 
Defendant's reference to Colo. Rev. Stat. § 18-1-804 (1986) 
does not advance his argument (Br. of Appellant at 10). Colorado 
has a different legal standard for involuntary intoxication and for 
insanity than Utah. Defendant undoubtedly prefers Colorado law, 
but it is not relevant to his case, and his argument is more 
appropriately directed to the Legislature. Citation to statutes or 
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case decisions from jurisdictions which adhere to legal standards 
which are different than Utah's is not helpful. 
The only Utah case which touches on involuntary intoxication 
is State v. Potter. 627 P.2d 75 (Utah 1981). The Court stated in 
dicta that "when intoxication, whether voluntary or involuntarily 
produced, negates the existence of the state of mind required for 
the commission of the crime, the act or omission which otherwise 
would constitute an offense is purged of its criminality." Id. at 
79. The case does not discuss irresistible impulse or the ability 
to conform one's conduct to the requirements of law. Rather, the 
relevant inquiry is whether the defendant was able to form the mens 
rea specified in the criminal statute. 
The trial court's order properly stated Utah law. As 
indicated above, the Utah Legislature in 1983 specifically 
abolished the "irresistible impulse" defense, as did Congress and 
a number of state legislatures. 
Had the trial court in the instant case ruled that 
irresistible impulse was an available defense, and had the court so 
instructed the jury at trial, it would have constituted error. See 
State v. Tost. 424 A.2d 293, 296, 297 (Conn. 1979) ("the commingling 
of old common-law rules with the statutory rule, could only create 
confusion as to what was the correct standard for determining 
insanity"; "the only standard by which to determine insanity as a 
defense to a crime is that found in [the criminal statutes]"). 
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CONCLUSION 
Based upon the foregoing, the State respectfully requests that 
the Court affirm defendant's conviction for first degree murder. 
DATED this / 3 ^ day of ^cri/C^J^2^i^ , 1992. 
R. PAUL VAN DAM 
Attorney General 
^ 
CREIGHTON C. HORTON II 
Assistant Attorney General 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of the 
foregoing BRIEF OF APPELLEE, postage prepaid, to Alan D. Boyack, 
attorney for defendant, at 205 East Tabernacle Street, St. George, 
Utah 84770, this j5_ day of ^fUn/^My&^^ , 1992. 
r^^CU/^ .rjn-
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ADDENDA 
ADDENDUM A 
Eric A. Ludlow #5104 jl G3T 21 PR 1 35 
Washington County Attorney 
178 North 200 East 
St. George, Utah 84770 
(801) 634-5723 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF WASHINGTON, STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, ) ORDER RE: LEGAL STANDARD 
APPLICABLE TO DEFENSE OF 
Plaintiff, ) INVOLUNTARY INTOXICATION 
-vs- ) (Nunc Pro Tunc Order to 
correct typographical error) 
) 
JOSEPH CHARLES GARDNER, JR., 
) Criminal No. 901502200 
Defendant. 
The above-entitled matter having come before the Court on 
the 26th day of November, 1991, on State's motion for pretrial 
determination of the legal standard applicable to the defense of 
involuntary intoxication, and the Defendant being present and 
represented by Alan D. Boyack, the Plaintiff being represented by 
Eric A. Ludlow, Washington County Attorney, and both Counsel having 
indicated the desire for a pretrial determination of the applicable 
legal standard, and the Court having allowed supplemental briefing 
at the Defendant's request; the Court, having now reviewed the 
memoranda and supplemental memoranda of the parties, hereby issues 
the following order pertaining to the legal standards and 
principles applicable to the case as follows: 
1. Involuntary intoxication leading to temporary mental 
illness can constitute a defense, if brought within the provisions 
of Utah Code Ann. § 76-2-305(1), which governs all mental illness 
defenses by its very terms. ["it is a defense to a 
prosecution — that the defendant, as a result of mental illness, 
lacked the mental state required as an element of the offense 
charged. Mental illness is not otherwise a defense.11] 
2. Irresistible impulse, or a determination of whether 
a defendant lacked substantial capacity to conform his conduct to 
the requirements of law, is no longer the legal standard applicable 
to a mental illness defense in Utah, since the Utah Legislature in 
enacting the present law (L. 1983, ch. 49, § 1) specifically 
repealed the former test for insanity, which then included lacking 
substantial capacity "to conform [one's] conduct to the 
requirements of law." (L. 1973, ch. 196, § 76-2-305). 
3. By statute, voluntary intoxication cannot constitute 
a complete defense to any crime which contains as an element of the 
charge or of a lesser included offense the culpable mental state of 
recklessness or of criminal negligence. [Utah Code Ann. § 76-2-306 
provides that "...if recklessness or criminal negligence 
establishes an element of an offense and the actor is unaware of 
the risk because of voluntary intoxication, his unawareness is 
immaterial in a prosecution for that offense."] 
4. Mental illness induced by voluntary intoxication is 
not a defense in Utah. ["A person who is under the influence of 
voluntarily consumed or injected alcohol, controlled substances, or 
volatile substances at the time of the alleged offense is not 
2 
excused from criminal responsibility on the basis of mental 
illness." Utah Code Ann. § 76-2-305(3).]' 
Nunc Pro Tunc order 
DATED this 8th day of January, 1992. 
J / / PHILIP 
¥i£th D i s t r i c t Court Judge 
- i K l L J f J l A H ) 
; 0 U W OF WASHINGTON)M 
BTH OISTPS^ COURI. certify fhattw* document 
trufe copy * Xr original document or> flic In 
Cterk'i otlic. 
WITNESS) ns< iano and tea! of the court 
this daje^Mrv^tKV&XSifaw 0 S y x £ 3 ^ . 
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ERIC A. LUDLOW - 5104 
Washington County Attorney 
178 North 200 East 
St. George, Utah 84770 
Telephone: (801) €34-5723 
R. PAUL VAN DAM - 3312 
Attorney General 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT ^^QlD^ 
IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF WASHINGTON, STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
-vs-
JOSEPH CHARLES GARDNER, JR., 
Defendant. 
MOTION AND STIPULATION TO 
CORRECT TYPOGRAPHICAL ERROR IN 
COURT'S ORDER RE: LEGAL STANDARD 
APPLICABLE TO DEFENSE OF 
INVOLUNTARY INTOXICATION 
Criminal No. 901502200 
Judge J. Philip Eves 
The State hereby moves the Court for a nunc pro tunc 
order correcting a typographical error which exists in its Order 
Re: Legal Standard Applicable to Defense of Involuntary 
Intoxication, dated January 8, 1992, for the following reasons: 
1. The parties stipulate that paragraph 3 of the Court's 
order should begin with the words "Voluntary intoxication" rather 
than "Involuntary intoxication," and that the present order reads 
incorrectly due to a typographical error. The parties further 
agree to and request a nunc pro tunc order dated January 8, 1992. 
2. Paragraph #3 of the Court's order begins, "By 
statute, involuntary intoxication cannot constitute—" That 
language tracked page 7, paragraph #3 of the State's Supplemental 
Memorandum of Points and Authorities Re: Legal Standard for 
Involuntary Intoxication, which begins, "Voluntary intoxication 
cannot by statute constitute..." 
3. The present wording of paragraph #3 of the order is 
internally inconsistent because it refers to involuntary 
intoxication while citing the statute pertaining to voluntary 
intoxication (Utah Code Ann. § 76-2-306). 
4. The order is the subject of a present appeal before 
the Utah Supreme Court in this case, and needs to be corrected for 
purposes of appellate review. 
WHEREFORE, the State respectfully requests that the Court 
sign the attached nunc pro tunc Order Re: Legal Standard Applicable 
to Defense of Involuntary Intoxication and direct the Clerk of the 
Court to certify this motion and the accompanying order, and 
forward them to the Utah Supreme Court after that Court grants the 
State's Motion to Supplement the Record. 
DATED this 1992. 
ERIC A. LUDLOW \ % 
Washington County Attorney 
CREIGHTON C. HORTON II 
Assistant Attorney General 
KEVIN L. MCCLOSKEY ^ ^ s 
Assistant Attorney-General 
STIPULATION OF DEFENSE COUNSEL 
I hereby stipulate to the correction in the Court's Order 
Re: Legal Standard Applicable to Defense of Involuntary 
Intoxication according to the terms and for the reasons set out 
above, and further stipulate that the Court may enter a nunc pro 
tunc order dated January 8, 1992. 
ALAN D . ~ B O Y K C K ~ 7 
Attorney for Defendant 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
This is to certify that I mailed a true and correct copy 
Of the foregoing MOTION AND STIPULATION TO CORRECT TYPOGRAPHICAL 
ERROR IN COURT'S ORDER RE: LEGAL STANDARD APPLICABLE TO DEFENSE OF 
INVOLUNTARY INTOXICATION, postage prepaid, to the following this 
Ek day of (Ja>hL^je^^ 1992: 
Alan D. Boyack 
Attorney at Law 
205 East Tabernacle, #203 
St. George, Utah 84770 
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ADDENDUM B 
TASK FORCE COMMITTEE ON INSANITY DEFENSE 
A REPORT ON THE INSANITY DEFENSE 
IN CRIMINAL PROSECUTION 
AND 
PROPOSED LEGISLATION 
Robert 6. Campbell/ Jr., Chairman 
Ronald N. Boyce, Esq. 
Dr. Lincoln Clark 
Earl R. Doriue, Esq. 
J. Thomas Greene, Esq. 
Dr. Bernard Grosser 
W. Eugene Hansen, Esq. 
Dr. Louis G. Moench 
Robert J. Stansfield, Esq. 
Dr. Jack L. Tedrow 
Robert Van Sciver, Esq. 
K. Robert Wright, Esq. 
December 27, 1982 
A REPORT ON THE INSANITY DEFENSE 
IN CRIMINAL PROSECUTION 
AND 
PROPOSED LEGISLATION 
The problem of insanity and the criminal defendant has been 
• matter of concern almost since the inception of criminal prose-
cutions. Early in the development of the English criminal law 
it vas ruled that a criminal act could not be punished if the 
actor had no more mental capacity then a "wild beast" or did not 
know "good from evil." As the judicial and medical communities 
acquired more sophistication concerning the mentally disturbed 
offender, the courts grappled with the issue of whether the 
ancient tests ought to be retained. In 1843, thirteen judges of 
the Queens Bench in England promulgated the so-called M'Neghten 
test in assessing whether the court that had acquitted Daniel 
M'Kaghten in the killing of the Secretary to the Prime Minister of 
England had acted erroneously. 
1« The M'Naghten Rule. 
The test for insanity as articulated by the English judges 
was that if a defendant, because of a defect in reason due to 
a disease of the mind, did not know the quality of his act or 
know that it was wrong, he was entitled to be acquitted. The 
standard was adopted at a time when the English courts had not 
fully developed the concept of "criminal intent" or the state of 
mind necessary to convict of certain offenses. The test of 
insanity was independent of the mental stete required for the 
offense and made the concept of insanity an affirmative defense. 
The M'Kaghten test was soon adopted in the United States and 
became the standard defense of insanity in almost all jurisdic-
tions in this country. 
2* Irresistible Impulse Test. 
After M'Kaghten had been utilized for a number of years, 
some courts supplemented the M'Kaghten standard by the so-called 
"irresistible impulse" test. That standard provided that if a 
criminal actor could not conform his conduct to the right he was 
entitled to acquittal. Utah adopted the modification of the 
M'Kaghten rule and it remained the law in the State of Utah up 
until 1973, when the Utah Criminal Code was modified to adopt a 
new standard. 
Other courts continued to struggle with the K'Kaghten for-
mula and its modification*, and in 1954 the United States Court 
of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit adopted the so-
called Durham test for insanity, which would exonerate a defen-
dant if his criminal conduct was the product of a mental disease 
er defect. Moat states rejected this experimentation as being 
too vague and too open-ended, and several years later the court 
that first Articulated the test rejected it. 
3. All and Utah Rule. 
In the meantime, the American Law Institute promulgated a 
new test for the insanity defense which was a modified version 
ef the M'Kaghten rule plus irresistible istpulae test that had 
been in effect in seme states including Utah. Sbe new version 
further expanded the insanity defense by providing that a person 
was not responsible for criminal conduct if, at the tim* ef such 
eonduct, as a result ef mental disease er defect, the actor lacked 
substantial capacity either to appreciate the wrongfulness of his 
conduct or to conform his conduct to the requirements of the lew. 
tThis standard ves adopted by statute in the State ef Utah in 1973. 
($ 76-2-305, Utah Code Ann. 1953). Further, in the State ef Utah, 
the burden ef proof is en the prosecution, when any evidence ef 
insanity is raised, to establish beyond a reasonable doubt that at 
the time the defendant committed the criminal act be was legally 
sane. In other states that burden is east en the defendant. 
4. Utah Law Compered to that in Bincklev. 
The law in the State ef Utah ia today identical to the law 
existing in the District ef Columbia as it was applied in the 
criminal prosecution against John Hinckley for the attempted 
assassination of President Reagan. Although the Hinckley eaae has 
awakened public concern with the insanity defenae, many lawyers, 
psychiatrists and scholars have been disenchanted with both the 
M'Kaghten standard and the American Lav Institute standard for some 
time. An extensive review ef the legal and psychiatric literature 
discussing the insanity defenae has been made by the committee. 
Although only a small percentage of criminal cases involve instances 
where the defense ef insanity is elaimed, that fact is no justifi-
cation for perpetuating an erroneous legal standard if, in fact, 
an erroneous legal standard haa been adopted. 
After extensive study, the committee concluded that the 
current test for insanity in the State ef Utah was conceptually 
erroneous* She error was not so much in the action taken by the 
American Law Institute as it was in the original concept of the 
insanity defense as outlined by the thirteen English judges in 
the M'Kaghten eaae. She committee has concluded that the ques-
tion that the jury or judge ought to address is whether the crimi-
nal dmfmnSmnt at the time ef the eenaissien of the act had the 
required state of mind defined for the commission of the offense. 
Zf a mental disease or defect precluded the defendant from enter-
taining the state of mind required for the offense charged, the 
defendant would be entitled to an acquittal on the charged offense 
and either a conviction should be entered on a lesser included 
offense for which the defendant did have the requisite state of 
mind, or if no such state of mind existed, the defendant should 
be acquitted Altogether. 
The defendant who is mentally illr but not without the power 
to form the required criminal intent, ought to be convicted the 
same as any other defendant who committed a crime with the 
requisite state of mind. Such a conceptualization makes the 
claim of mental illness relevant to the state of mind of the 
defendant at the time of the commission of the offense, just as 
if the defendant had raised defenses other than mental illness, 
such as mistake of fact or lack of intent or any ether condition 
that would cause a judge or jury to find that the defendant did 
not commit the offense charged. The insanity defense would no 
longer be an affirmative defense to be considered by the trier 
of fact independent of the defendant's state of mind. The burden, 
of course, would be on the prosecution, as it now is, to show 
that the defendant acted with the required criminal intent but 
there would be no other burden required to be met by the prosecution, 
nor would there be any other legal concept for the jury to consider? 
This standard has ^tn proposed by eminent scholars throughout 
the United States and is reflected in proposed legislation cur-
rently before Congress, and legislation that has been before 
Congress in one form or another since If73. This conceptual for-
mat has recently been adopted in one form or another with the 
same effect in the Stat' .4of Idaho, Montana and Alabama. 
5. Committee Recommendation. 
The committee recommended that the standard for determining 
whether a defendant should be convicted of an offense, although 
mentally ill, would be whether 
•as a result of the mental illness [the 
defendant] lacked the mental state required 
as an element of the offense charged.* 
Mental illness would not otherwise constitute a defense and 
the term mental illness would not include voluntary intoxication. 
Mental illness would include a mental disease or defect. The 
legislation proposed by the committee would authorize a specific 
plea of "not guilty due to mental illness" and invoke procedures 
for examination of a defendant by qualified experts to determine 
the condition of the defendant at the time of the commission of 
the offense. The so-called battle of the psychiatrists would 
not be entirely eliminated, but it would be significantly reduced 
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because the scope of psychiatric opinion would consider only the 
question of whether the defendant had the required criminal state 
of mind, and would not consider what the committee believes to be 
the unanswerable question as to volition. 
If, however, there ever were a defendant with such a deranged 
condition that he absolutely could not control his behavior 
(although he knew what he was doing), his actions would not be 
"voluntary acts" within the requirement of the Utah Penal Code 
(S 76-1-601(1), Utah Code Ann. 1953). Zt is unlikely, in any 
•vent, that any such person would ever be brought to trial. The 
affect of the new test for insanity would be to narrow the defense 
from its current broad standard to one examining the mental state 
of the defendant at the time that the act was committed, and to 
harmonize it with the prosecution's burden in every criminal ease. 
The total abolition of any consideration of mental illness or 
insanity would, in the committee's opinion, be unconstitutional. 
Furthermore, the defendant who raises a defense of mental illness 
on the issue of the requisite state of mind cannot be deprived of 
the opportunity to offer relevant evidence on the issue. To do so 
would treat the mentally ill defendant in a different classifica-
tion from other defendants who might also raise the defense of the 
lack of required state of mind and the disparate treatment would 
deny such defendant the equal protection of the law. 
The committee also recommends that changes be made in the 
Criminal Code and Code of Criminal Procedure to harmonize the new 
mental illness concept with required court procedures, including 
the requirement that notice be given not only of a elaim of total 
exoneration due to mental illness, but of any claim of diminished 
capacity. The defendant could enter a plea that he lacked the 
required mental capacity, or in the alternative, could deny the 
commission of the offense itself. (This could occur in a homicide 
ease where a defendant contends that he was so mentally ill as to 
be unable to form the required state of mind for the commission 
of the offense, but that if he had the required state of mind to 
commit the offense, he was privileged to act as he did due to 
self-defense.) 
6. 'Guilty and Mentally 111" Concept. 
The committee believes that the proposed legislation would 
significantly improve the administration of justice in instances 
where mental illness is an issue in a criminal prosecution. Xn 
order to deal with the instances where a defendant may be mentally 
ill, but not so ill as to be free from criminal responsibility, 
the committee proposes that the concept of "guilty and mentally 
ill" be added to Utah law to deal with a special class of offenders. 
This concept has currently been adopted in some form by the 
legialaturea of at leaat ten atatas. The committee did not parrot 
the legislative format in any state, but tailored the proposal to 
what was 'believed to be the best consensus of all the legislation 
and one compatible with and in keeping with the available resources 
in the State of Utah. 
Accordingly, under the Committee proposal, f 77-13-1, Utah 
Code Ann. (1953) would be amended to include five possible pleas 
to the.offence charged. In addition to the pleas of-not guilty, 
'guilty and*no contest currently provided for under the statute, a 
defendant could enter a plea of "not guilty by reason of mental 
illness," or "guilty and mentally ill." If a defendant enters a 
plea.of not guilty by reason of mental illness, as previously 
explained, he would place in issue the question of whether his 
alleged mental illness precluded him from entertaining the state 
of mind required for the offense charged. (A defendant would be 
allowed to plead not guiltyt or in the alternative, net guilty by 
reason of mental illness.) 
If, on the other hand, a defendant enters a plea of "guilty 
and mentally ill," such would not exonerate or exeuse defendant's 
conduct. The offender found "guilty and mentally ill" is a person 
responsible for his criminal activities and held accountable for 
such under the law, but who may need specialized treatment. 
Zn view of the additional pleas authorized under the Committee 
proposal, the Committee also recommends amendment of $ 77-35-21(a) 
to allow the jury, in addition to a verdict of guilty or not guilty, 
to return a verdict of "not guilty by reason of mental illness," 
"guilty and mentally ill," "not guilty of the crime charged but 
guilty of a lesser included offense," or "not guilty of the crime 
charged but guilty of a lesser included offense and mentally ill." 
7. Procedure upon Entry of a Plea of "Guilty and Mentally 111." 
If a defendant proffers a plea of guilty and mentally ill, 
the Court will hold a hearing to determine the claims of mental 
illness, and may order an evaluation of defendant by a suitable 
medical facility. If the trial judge finds that the defendant was 
mentally ill within the definition of that term, the judge could 
then dispose of the offender through various alternatives that 
would insure some degree of special custody and/or treatment. If 
the judge found that the defendant was not mentally ill, the guilty 
plea remains and the defendant would be sentenced as any other 
offender. 
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If the defendant enteri a plea of "not guilty by reason of 
mental illness," a jury could also receive evidence that the 
defendant, vas currently mentally ill* as veil as at the time ef 
the commieaion of the offense, and could return a verdict of 
"guilty and mentally ill".. However, the jury's verdict would be 
subject to a post-verdict hearing and the court would be required 
to confirm that the defendant was, in fact, currently mentally ill. 
If the defendant was found to be mentally ill, the eourt could then 
dispose of the case by sentencing the offender to the term pro-
vided by law, but the offender could be institutionaliied or dealt 
with in a more'sultable custodial or therapeutic setting. ~~~ 
The criteria for defining a person "guilty and mentally ill," 
and thereby subject to the special disposition by the court, have 
been carefully and narrowly drawn so as not to overload the mental 
health system which already has limited resources. Only those 
offenders who meet a carefully selected mix of criteria would be 
eligible for this special disposition. This process allows for 
the identification, confirmation and disposition of those special 
offenders who should not be excused from criminal responsibility 
but who should be recognized as having special needs reguiring"a 
particular type of custody or treatment. 
An offender found guilty and mentally ill would not be 
released from serving his sentence unless the Board of Pardons 
determined, under criteria normally applied by the Beard, that 
the person should be released. Additionally, if the Board con-
siders a defendant for parole, it must consult with the treating 
facility, and upon recommendation ef the facility, will make 
continued treatment a condition of parole. A person determined 
to be guilty and mentally ill who is in need ef further institu-
tionalization beyond the period provided by the criminal offense 
for which he was convicted should be certified for commitment 
through civil process. 
Studies that have been done ef the application ef the "guilty 
and mentally ill" concept in other jurisdictions have shown that 
it does not overburden the system, does not provide an excuse for 
juries to convict when they shouldn't, and is not used to excuse 
a defendant's conduct. The concept appears to have been especially 
promising in the State of Michigan. 
8. Conclusion. 
The concepts that the Committee has recommended for legislative 
adoption have been thoughtfully considered. They are based upon 
considerations of scholarly analysis, empirical research reports, 
multi-disciplinary input, and sources outside of the Committee, 
itself, which have been carefully and intelligently advanced by 
persons interested in this subject matter. It is believed that 
the Committee report reflects the best thinking of the legal and 
mental health community in the state and is corroborated by 
similar conclusions from others in Utah and in other parts of the 
country. Therefore, the Committee respectfully recommends to the 
Legislature the adoption of the attached legislation relating to 
the issue of insanity and mental illness in criminal cases as 
proposed by the Committee. 
TASK FORCE COMMITTEE ON INSANITY 
DEFENSE 
Robert S. Campbell, Jr., Chairman 
Ronald N. Boyce, Esq. 
•Dr. Lincoln Clark 
Earl R. Dorius, Esq. 
J. Thomas Greene, Esq. 
Dr. Bernard Grosser 
W. Eugene Hansen, Esq. 
**Dr. Louis G. Moeneh 
••Robert J, Stansfield, Esq. 
Dr. Jack L. Tedrow 
••Robert Van Seiver, Esq. 
K. Robert Wright, Esq. 
•Concurs in amendment of Section 76-2-305, but dissents from 
remainder of Committee Report and Recommendation. The Chairman 
believes that this position is .sound and very possibly, preferable. 
••Dissents from Committee Report and Recommendation. 
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